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OF MONSTERS UNLEASHED:
A MODEST BEGINNING
TO A CASUISTRY OF CLONING
CATH JUNE COOKSON*
If an educated man is armed with only reason, if he is disdainful of

custom and ignores strength offeeling, if he thinks of "prejudice"and
"intolerance" as words with no connotations that are not disgraceful
and is blind to religious conviction, he had better not venture outside
his academy, for if he does he will have to deal with forces he cannot
understand.'
Fear. Horror. Hunger for glory. The driving urge to create and to
discover. These passions, and more, dominate the moral debate over cloning,
and we ignore them at our peril. The challenge is how to take due account of
the feelings and images that swirl around this issue, while not letting them
dominate the public discourse. In this Article, I offer a modest suggestion: the
process of casuistry2 is well suited to advance the public debate over the ethics
of cloning beyond the emotive level of discourse.

J.D., Rutgers University, 1980; M.A. [Religious Studies], The University of Virginia, 1992;
Ph.D. [Religious Studies], Indiana University, 1997; Visiting Assistant Professor, Indiana
University-Bloomington, Department of Religious Studies. The author's areas of interest are ethics,
law and religion in America, and religion and social issues. The author wishes to thank Ann
Mongoven for her helpful critique of the draft.
1. LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 95-96 (1968).
2. Casuistry is common to both legal and ethical reasoning. In a traditional casuistical analysis,
the context of the case at hand fuels the reasoning process: the first question asked is not "what is
the law?" but "what is going on here?" Context and facts, not vague impressions, drive the ethical
inquiry. Yet, casuistry is not a form of relativism or "situation ethics." Principles are taken into
account, not as philosophical abstractions, but as they are embodied in clear paradigmatic instances
in which there is no doubt that the particular principle applies (in the common law, these paradigms
are called precedents). The particulars of the paradigm are compared with the context of the current
case to see how far, on a continuum, the paradigm is from the matter at hand. The closer our
present case is to the paradigm, the more certain is our ethical judgment.
Thus, the vital move in casuistry is from abstract principles to paradigmatic illustrations of
those principles. These paradigms concretize and embody the essence of the evil or harm that the
moral law was most clearly meant to avoid or prohibit, and/or the essence of the good that the
principle was most clearly meant to promote. Kenneth Kirk notes that "every principle, to be
morally operative, must be accompanied by illustrations and examples" and that "such principle is
partially illuminated by the known instances in which it holds good." KENNETH E. KIRK,
CONSCIENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CASUISTRY 107 (1936).
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Casuistry relies heavily upon analogy. Not-so-coincidentally, moral debates
over cutting edge biotechnology are generally dependent upon analogical
argument because no precedents exist to apply to these state-of-the-art contexts.
Indeed, much of the controversy surrounding the new technologies involves
precisely the following question: which moral analogy is most relevant? By
employing the new technology, are we transgressing some vital moral boundary?
Or are we simply adding a new illustration to the existing list of examples of a
generally acknowledged good?'
One key difference between the moral argument of ethical casuistry4 and
the legal casuistry involved in the analysis of a case at bar is the lack of an a
priori agreement on moral good and on moral boundaries. Lawyers and judges
can turn to an authoritative, standard set of laws (and even to paradigmatic
illustrations of those laws). Moral discourse in our plural society, however,
does not always have the luxury of generally accepted standards and rules, and
disagreement over the authority and relevancy of principles and their paradigms
forms a key part of public debates over morality as well as proper social policy.
The cloning debate fits into this latter category. The public discourse is keenly
confused and divided on the issue of which principles are relevant and which
paradigms apply.

3. One illustration of this is the assessment of the ethics of embryonic gene manipulation. If
used in a therapeutical context to cure a genetically transmitted disease, then this use, some would
argue, is most like traditional medicine in which the cure of disease is not simply morally
acceptable, but can be morally compelling. If, however, the process is used to genetically
"enhance" offspring according to "socially prescribed blueprints of perfection," then the case more
closely fits the paradigmatic moral evil of eugenics. Glenn McGee, Parentingin an Era of Genetics,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 16, 17. McGee notes that not every enhancement effort,
of course, is the moral equivalent of eugenics. More important, for McGee, is not the use of genetic
enhancement in and of itself so much, but, rather, the "deadly sins" that parents commit against
their children, sins that are a danger in any type of enhancement effort. Id. at 17. These parental
sins are "calculativeness, overbearingness, shortsightedness, hasty judgment, and pessimism." Id.
Paradigmatic examples of the moral horror of eugenics are Nazi efforts to achieve a "pure" race,
as well as efforts here in the United States to minimize the procreation of "inferior" humans for the
good of the society through forced sterilization. See THE LYNCHBURG STORY: EUGENIC
STERILIZATION IN AMERICA (Wordview Pictures 1993).
4. Helpful works explaining and developing casuistry as an analytical process for ethical
decision-making are the following: ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY:
A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988); John D. Arras, Principles and
Particularity:The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J. 983 (1994); Richard B. Miller, Narrative
and Casuistry: A Response to John Arras, 69 IND. L.J. 1015 (1994). James F. Childress notes the
widespread use of an ethical process that eschews absolutist principalism and gives due attention to
the contextual particulars in James F. Childress, Moral Norms in PracticalEthical Reflection, in
CHRISTIAN ETHICS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 196 (Lisa Sowle Cahill & James F. Childress eds.,
1996). Childress, however, uses a definition of casuistry that is more limited than my operating
approach to casuistry. See Catharine Cookson, Bridging the Garden and the Wilderness: A
Proposed Alternative Process for Resolving Free Exercise Conflicts (1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author).
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Adding to the muddle of the public debate is the sometimes lurking, and
sometimes explicit, recourse to horror stories of fantastic experiments that have
gone awry. Such citation to tales of horror blurs the boundary between moral
fable and paradigmatic case, however. The popular images of the stories of
Frankenstein and the Jurassic Park, for example, are not paradigmatic cases in
the casuistic sense of "paradigm": they are not specific, contextualized cases
with practical details for comparison and contrast. Particularly in the context
of the debate over cloning, such tales (or, at least, the popular images conjured
by these tales) are vehicles for the expression of our greatest fears and imagined
horrors. Arguments premised upon such fables are dismissed at our peril,
however: cautionary tales that have a strong grip on the public's imagination

tend to contain the most piercing insights into the general human condition. As
such, these fables have a place in the moral discussion. The problem is how to
usefully and properly incorporate these metaphorical stories into a reasoned
debate over cloning.
Casuistry neither ignores metaphorical fables as irrelevant, nor privileges
them as authoritative precedent. Fictional narratives instead are most usefully
treated as general maxims whose aphorisms (i.e., the morals of the stories) can
be used in the accumulation of arguments for or against a particular resolution
of the case at hand.' The key to the narratives is to extract the moral truth that

5. Jonsen and Toulmin are better at giving examples of maxims than at precisely defining them.
They explain, for example, that maxims are aphorisms that are more particular than broad
commandments (Thou shalt not lie), yet more general than paradigms. Typical maxims, for
example, range from "Don't kick a man when he's down" to "A lesser evil can be tolerated to
prevent a greater." JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 4, at 253. "These maxims," note Jonsen and
Toulim, "are seldom further proved; their relevance is seldom explicitly demonstrated; yet they play
an important role in the development of a moral argument." Id.
They note elsewhere that, in resolving concrete issues in fields such as bioethics (or
biotechnology), the offerings of most novelists are helpful only generally, and not in the most
particularized sense of concrete experience. They write:
Novelists and others may frame some rough moral generalizations about broad kinds of
human actions and motives-for example, treachery or innocence-but except for a few
authors such as Iris Murdoch, these rarely involve deep analytical or theoretical insight,
and they often rise scarcely above the level of homespun maxims such as, "Honesty is
the best policy." Meanwhile problems of moral appraisal, merit, or obligation arise out
of experience in actual practice on occasions and in ways that need to be looked at in
all their relevant detail. Like the clinical judgment of a perceptive physician, moral
wisdom (phronesis) "speaks to the condition" of a particular agent, acting in a specific
situation.
Id. at 296. This points up some very serious drawbacks to the casuistical method as described by
Jonsen and Toulmin: it is geared to explicit and precise cases. What, then, does the casuist do
when faced with the need to make broad policy determinations about cutting-edge technology? As
demonstrated in this article, I think that the casuistical method can also be used to formulate an
appropriate, nuanced approach to future-directed public policy issues, such as those posed by
cloning. Casuistry enables imaginative, analogical analysis and solutions. And it can move the
debate beyond abstractions and conflicts of principles to a focused assessment of the context at hand.
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has resonated with the public. These insights can then be usefully added to the
arguments that cumulatively shape the ultimate resolution or response.
In the case of cloning, narratives are particularly useful because of the
novelty of the context, and yet they must be used with particular caution
precisely because the context is novel. There are no paradigmatic precedents
on point, because no one has done this sort of thing before. Hence we are, as
already noted, left to our imaginations or to reasoning by analogy, to known
situations. Fictional narratives exploring matters close to the issue are
imaginative journeys into the Brave New World6 that we now, in the real
world, are poised to actually enter. Authors such as Mary Shelley and Michael
Crichton cannot provide us with a roadmap of detailed particulars, as actual
paradigms do, but they can remind us of the dangers of our human failings and
thus outline possible pitfalls in the journey. It is in this spirit that I will now
examine two science fiction narratives that have not only resonated with the
public psyche, but also are representative, I think, of fears which underlie the
cloning debate: Mary Shelley's Frankenstein7 and Michael Crichton's Jurassic
Park.8
Frankenstein is probably the most difficult to analyze because there are
numerous movie versions, two distinct written editions, and an archetypal
Frankenstein monster that has assumed a life of its own in popular culture. As
might be expected, the Mary Shelley novel is far more nuanced and complex
than the popular image of an evil scientist creating a monster that runs amuck.
The novel's scientist, Frankenstein, is both flawed and heroic.
Frankenstein and the first narrator of the story, the adventurer and letter
writer Robert Walton, are driven by the same passions to "be the first," to (as
they said on the original Star Trek) "go where no man has gone before."
Walton writes to his sister, Margaret, of his quest to sail to the North Pole: "I
shall satiate my ardent curiosity with the sight of a part of the world never
before visited, and may tread a land never before imprinted by the foot of man.
These are my enticements, and they are sufficient to conquer all fear of danger
or death."" Profit and wealth play no role in this quest. Walton instead
envisions himself as an altruist whose scientific discoveries shall "confer on all
mankind to the last generation" an "inestimable benefit.""

6. See ALDOUs HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).

7. See infra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
9. MARY W. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN:

OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 17 (Courage Books

1990) (1831) [hereinafter SHELLEY (1831)].
10. SHELLEY (1831), supra note 9, at 18.
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Walton and Frankenstein meet when Walton's crew rescues Frankenstein
from the arctic waters. Telling Frankenstein of his quest, Walton exclaims that
the price he might pay is of no moment: "how gladly I would sacrifice my
fortune, my existence, my every hope to the furtherance of my enterprise.""
In his feverish enthusiasm, Walton reveals the lengths to which he would go to
accomplish his dream: "One man's life or death were but a small price to pay
for the acquirement of the knowledge which I sought; for the dominion I should
acquire and transmit over the elemental foes of our race." 12
Walton's revelation evokes a heart-wrenched outburst from Frankenstein:
"Unhappy man! Do you share my madness? Have you drank also of the
intoxicating draught? Hear me-let me reveal my tale and you will dash the cup
from your lips!"13 And thus begins Frankenstein's tale of horror.
Frankenstein's transgression is not uniquely his own but echoes Adam and
14
Eve's Fall. He had aspired to "become greater than his nature will allow,"
and he yearned to be creator:
A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy
and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could
claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve
theirs.'s

11. Id. at 25.
12. Id.
13. SHELLEY (1831), supra note 9, at 25-26. This edition is a reprint of the 1831 edition,
published by Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, London. Interestingly, this last anguished
exchange was not in the earlier edition. In the first version, Mary Shelley had instead described a
Frankenstein who was more didactic than horror-stricken:
Yesterday the stranger [Frankenstein] said to me [Walton writes], "You may easily
perceive, Captain Walton, that I have suffered great and unparalleled misfortunes. I had
determined, once, that the memory of these evils should die with me; but you have won
me to alter my determination. You seek for knowledge and wisdom, as I once did; and
I ardently hope that the gratification of your wishes may not be a serpent to sting you,
as mine has been. I do not know that the relation of my misfortunes will be useful to
you, yet, if you are inclined, listen to my tale. I believe that the strange incidents
connected with it will afford a view of nature, which may enlarge your faculties and
understanding.
MARY W. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN: 1818 TEXT, CONTEXTS, NINETEENTH-CENTURY RESPONSES,
MODERN CRITICISM 17 (J. Paul Hunter ed., 1996) (1818) [hereinafter SHELLEY (1818)]. For
sparking my treatment of Frankensteinand its moral, Iam endebted to the nuanced, stimulative, and
imaginative critical essays offered in this Norton Critical Edition.
14. SHELLEY (1831), supra note 9, at 42. See also SHELLEY (1818), supranote 13, at 31 (same
text).
15. SHELLEY (1831), supra note 9.at43. See also SHELLEY (1818), supranote 13, at 32 (same
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Frankenstein's single-minded devotion to his pursuit numbed his conscience. He
kept his work a secret from everyone, and thus there was no one to call him
back to his senses. As he relates this tale to Walton, Frankenstein now recoils
in horror at the activities that he had once performed so routinely:
I pursued nature to her hiding-places. Who shall conceive the horrors
of my secret toil, as I dabbled among the unhallowed damps of the
grave, or tortured the living animal to animate the lifeless clay? My
limbs now tremble, and my eyes swim with the remembrance; but then
a resistless, almost frantic, impulse, urged me forward; I seemed to
have lost all soul or sensation but for this one pursuit ....
I collected
bones from charnel-houses; and disturbed, with profane fingers, the
tremendous secrets of the human frame.. In a solitary chamber, or
rather cell, at the top of the house, and separated from all other
apartments by a gallery and staircase, I kept my workshop of filthy

creation ...

16

Frankenstein's flaws are an inordinate self-pride and arrogance, and an intense
preoccupation with accomplishing what no one had done before. These excesses
both fueled his scientific inquiry and overrode his moral sensibilities.
Importantly, Shelley portrays Frankenstein's fall as part of the common human
condition-she warns us that Frankenstein's flaws are our flaws, too.
Frankenstein compounded his transgressions by abandoning his creature at
its birth. Rather than take responsibility for what he had made, he ran in
horror:
I had desired [the ability to infuse life into an inanimate body] with an
ardour that had far exceeded moderation; but now that I had finished,
the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust
filled my heart. Unable to endure the aspect of the being I had
created, I rushed out of the room .... 17
Frankenstein's failure to attend to the consequences of his creative actions
ultimately causes the being's destructive rampage. Tellingly, the creature
avenges itself by killing the innocent; the forces Frankenstein unleashed crash
upon those who least deserve such tragedy.

16. SHELLEY (1831), supra note 9, at43. See also SHELLEY (1818), supra note 13, at 32 (same

text).
17. SHELLEY (1831), supra note 9, at 45. See also SHELLEY (1818), supra note 13, at 34 (same

text).
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The moral fable of the Frankenstein genre is further developed by Michael
Crichton in the book Jurassic Park: humans as creators myopically fixated on
a goal without regard for the consequences. What Crichton brings to Shelley's
basic formula is the power of money. Big money.
Bioengineered DNA was, weight for weight, the most valuable
material in the world. A single microscopic bacterium, too small to
see with the naked eye, but containing the genes for a heart-attack
enzyme, streptokinase, or for "ice-minus," which prevented frost
damage to crops, might be worth five billion dollars to the right
buyer."S
Crichton has given us a modem fable wherein profits and the thrill of discovery
have become the Absolute, blinding one to the dangers and potential effects of
the activity. Secrecy compounds the problem, for it prevents others with clearer
sight from intervening.
Crichton furthermore highlights the modem problem of dispersed power.
Frankenstein acted on his own; there were no layers of supervisors, experts,
lawyers, accountants, investors, etc., and no other specialists with whom
Frankenstein had to collaborate. The modem corporate world of venture
capitalists, interlocking companies, and highly-specialized professionals has
made it harder to pinpoint any one person as committing a transgression causing
harm, the traditional sin of commission, while making it easier .to fall into sins
of omission. Crichton's paleontologist, Alan Grant, angrily confronts lawyer
Donald Gennaro (the investment banking lawyer) with his particular sins of
omission:
"You sold investors on an undertaking you didn't fully
understand. You were part owner of a business you failed to
supervise. You did not check the activities of a man you knew from
experience to be a liar, and you permitted that man to screw around
with the most dangerous technology in human history. I'd say you
shirked your responsibility."
Gennaro coughed again. "Well, now I'm taking responsibility
[by having the military bomb the island and destroy it by air]."
"No," Grant said. "You're still shirking it. And you can't do that
anymore." . .

18.

MICHAEL CRICHTON, JuRAssIc PARK 69 (1990).
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. .. Grant turned to Gennaro. "Your island is a mess, Mr.
Gennaro. Your experiment is a mess. It has to be cleaned up. But
you can't do that until you know the extent of the mess. We have to
account for every animal born on this island. Then we can burn it
down. "'9
Setting aside the dramatics of the situation and the caricatures, the scene conveys
a clear moral: sins of omission are as deadly as sins of commission.
Responsibility is abdicated when a person in power fails to supervise carefully.
An even more particular moral of this exchange is that it is an abdication of
responsibility when one in power continually defers to "the experts." The
specter raised by Crichton in Jurassic Park is more than just dinosaurs run
amuck; it is corporations run amuck. The dispersion of responsibility in modern
enterprises too often means that no one is responsible.'0
What do these horror fictions from popular culture add to the legal and
ethical discussion over cloning?
Precisely this:
the public's fears of
biotechnology surface in the form of such nightmarish popular images, and the
proponents of biotechnological experimentation and development (such as
cloning) have not directly addressed them. Pro-human-cloning arguments
understandably have centered on the factual debunking of the typical cloning
rumors and fantasies. Human clones do not emerge fully-grown from the test
tubes; an army of Hitler/Nazi clones, for example, could not threaten the world
tomorrow. Any clones would start out as infants that are born and grow to
maturity as any other child. The importance of nurture, as well as nature
(genetics), is emphasized.
And the notion that the creation ultimately
undermines the goal of the creator"' is repeated in response to ethicists'
objections that people (with vicious or good intentions) will clone themselves or
beloved others, driven by the improper desire to continue the existence of the
cloned dead. Such schemes, cloning advocates well note, are doomed to
failure.22

19. CRICHTON, supra note 18, at 370-71.
20. Christopher Stone has examined the problem of corporate structures that result in, if not
encourage, irresponsibility and lack of oversight on ethical issues. See CHRISTOPHER STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
21. The inevitability that the creation will not honor or obey (and will even undo) the creator
is also reflected in both Frankenstein and JurassicPark. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying

text.
22. These arguments, of course, are directed to human cloning efforts and do not assuage the
public's fear of man-made demon-creatures getting loose (flushed mistakenly out into the world
through sinks and drains?) and destroying the world-as-we-know-it.
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While such examinations of results in context are a driving force of
casuistry, these educational efforts alone will not assuage the public's fears of
cloning horrors because these factual assurances are directed only at the
nightmares themselves, and not the root causes. In other words, the popular
horror images and beliefs about cloning are the result of the fears and not
necessarily the sole cause of the fears. The nightmarish images persist despite
educational efforts, in part because of a perception that the very process of
discovery, invention, and production is itself out of control.
Genetic enterprises especially and inherently implicate the future of life
itself and the issue of humans "playing God." The public perceives that profits,
investment, and the thrill of discovery and of being "the first," are driving the
biotechnology business. The public suspects that no one cares about the long
term consequences but only about short term profits, that there are no external
checks and balances, that power is too diffused under the corporate framework,
and thus no one within the enterprise is ultimately responsible for the public's
safety.
The Frankenstein maxim of bearing responsibility for what one has created
has found its way into the common law. For example, a New Jersey court
pronounced a "Frankenstein monster" theory of toxic tort liability: if you make
the monster and it escapes, you are absolutely liable for the damage it causes. 23
Such after-the-fact moral and common law responsibility, however, is of little
comfort to innocent victims of irreversible damage. In its collective rush to
encourage corporate flourishing, our society - has neglected the issue of
community flourishing. We have blithely assumed that the two are one and the
same. In areas such as cloning, which the general public views with suspicion
and fear, a necessary prerequisite to gaining societal approval to carry on the

23. Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). In this case,
people living near a landfill alleged damages caused by toxins that leaked from the landfill as runoff, leachate, and/or fumes. The generators of the waste claimed that they had no responsiblity for
the damage because the waste was not under their control. The court rejected this logic:
Since the potential for calamity lurking in an abnormally dangerous substance is
precisely what justifies the imposition of absolute liability, the place where the substance
ultimately does its marauding should not serve to dissipate such liability. A company
which creates the Frankenstein monster of abnormally dangerous waste should not
exptect to be relieved of accountability for the depredations of its creature merely
because the company entrusts the monster's care to another, even an independent
contractor.
Id. at 1320-21 (emphasis added). This is a variant of the principle from Rylands v. Fletcher: one
who brings onto land something (in the Rylands case, a reservoir of water) that is abnormal or
unduly dangerous is responsible for the damage it causes if it escapes. Good intentions and lofty
purposes do not matter: if your activity results in harm, you are responsible. See Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338 (1868). See also W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEErON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 (5th ed. 1984).
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work is clarifying the biotech company's preventive responsibilities to safeguard
the public's health, safety, and ethical sensibilities. In other words, the way to
ensure that corporate flourishing leads to community flourishing is to re-fasten
the bindings of public responsibility onto corporations and the persons who run
them, particularly in areas such as cloning where the stakes involve the stuff of
life itself.
In sum, cloning is a new frontier, and no one can predict the future. In
this situation, biotechnology's assurances as to safe outcomes will not assuage
the public fear, because the process of biotechnological research, development,
and production itself is not fail-safe.'
Biotech companies that undertake
cloning projects have the burden of proving to a fearful public that a
well-designed system of internal as well as external checks and balances exists
to protect society's interests up-front. The public's perception is that laws
assessing accountability after-the-fact are too little, too late, when the monster
has already done its irreparable worst.
The usual, unimaginative options for legal accountability are corporate
laissez-faire (deference to corporate control with lawsuits to assess after-the-fact
damages) and government regulatory control. However, systemic accountability
and safeguards need not be solely the responsibility of either the corporation or
bureaucratic government regulation. Casuistry looks to analogy for creative
solutions, and I suggest that the model offered by the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) is one private regulatory success that the
biotechnology field would do well to emulate. ANSI notes, "ANSI does not
itself develop American National Standards . . . ; rather, it facilitates
development by establishing consensus among qualified groups."' Members
of the committees that establish the standards come from all interested areas of
society: industry, labor, technical experts from academe, government regulatory
agencies, etc.

24. As Robert Bums's maxim goes:
The best laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft agley,
An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain,
For promis'd joy!
Robert Bums, To a Mouse, in POEMS AND SONGS OF ROBERT BURNS 111, 112 (James Barke ed.,

1960).
25. American National Standards Insitute, An Introduction to ANSI, ANSI Online (last modified
February 26, 1998) < http://web.ansi.org/public/about.htm >. The ANSI organization and process
also offers a model for internationalcooperation and consensus on standards for biotechnologies
such as cloning. ANSI cooperates with and is part of a larger, international, standards-setting
organization. Such international private regulatory control would obviate the problem of corporate
forum-shopping, i.e., relocating its research facilities to the nation that would regulate the least. (In
JurassicPark, for example, the facilities were on an island belonging to Costa Rica.)

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss2/4

Cookson and Ramsey: Of Monsters Unleashed: A Modest Beginning to a Casuistry of Cloni

1998]

ON MONSTERS UNLEASHED

429

In the case of cloning and other biotechnological endeavors, the ANSI
consensus model offers a "middle way" between the laissez-faire and
governmental control approaches. Such a private, non-profit group would
provide a forum for input from interested/affected members of the general
public, especially non-dominant groups whose voices are not heard in the
corporate board room or by the professional association committee.26 The
ANSI model also does not have the usual enforcement problems of other
voluntary committees; once the standards are agreed upon and adopted by the
committees, they are then often adopted wholesale by the United States
regulatory agency for that area and enforced as any other government regulation.
Additionally, the tort system informally enforces ANSI regulations in that a
product that does not conform to the applicable standard is assumed to be
defective. Although this is often an after-the-fact remedial process (that is, after
irreparable damage has been done), liability insurance carriers can aid in the
preemptive enforcement of standards through their risk assessment inspections
and inquiries during the rate-setting process. Risky endeavors that may be
outside the standards are assessed appreciably higher rates (if they are covered
at all).
Providing a system of enforced responsibility that looks to long term effects
and social good will not, however, satisfy all objections to cloning. Many hold
that the very activity itself is blasphemous, that we cross the boundary of what
is proper for human beings when we manipulate the genetic code and deny
uniqueness to creatures whom God intended to be the singular result of the
random merger of genes from father and mother. Such deontological (i.e., the
breaking of the rules) and teleological (i.e., the violating of the natural law, or
what is proper for human flourishing, etc.) arguments can be
conversation-stoppers in public discourse." "Consensus" does not mean that

26. For instance, I understand from discussions at the 1997 meeting of the American Academy
of Religion's Section on Indigenous Religious Traditions that the Human Genome Project Task Force
was surprised at the vehement objections raised by indigenous peoples against the harvesting of their
genes.
27. At this point, something must be said regarding rules for conducting discussions within a
format modeled on ANSI. It is far easier, I would think, to reach a consensus on engineering
matters than on public policy issues such as cloning. For guidance on rules of public discourse,
therefore, I enthusiastically recommend CHRISTOPHER MOONEY, BOUNDARIES DIMLY PERCEIVED:
LAW, RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND THE COMMON GOOD (1990). While directed at public discourse
over issues of law and religion, its vision is certainly helpful for public discourse on any contentious
matter. Mooney emphasizes the inevitability of conflict and the necessity of compromise. All rival
moral claims and values cannot prevail.
Accordingly, Mooney sees two choices as to discourse: public discourse and "political
discourse." Id. at 29-31. Political discourse is the use of public law and political power to force
one constituency's views upon the rest of society "to oppose one ideology with another." Id. at 29.
Mooney observes:
The whole effort has nothing to do with public discourse and in fact testifies to a loss of
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one group may hold the entire process hostage. It does mean that all must enter
the process willing to compromise. I suggest that casuistical reasoning can help
continue the conversation by engaging in the discussion of analogies and
paradigms.2" And in the meantime, cloning activities that are not controversial

These
confidence in such discussion, as does every other attempt at single issue politics ....
issues are raised in public not because questions are thought to be open, offering hope of
creative answers and shared meanings, but because they are presumed to be closed to all
considerations of change.
Id. at 29-30. This option is warfare, with coercion as the weapon of choice.
The second option open to those who seek to influence public policy directly is to participate
in what Mooney terms "public discourse." Such discourse seeks creative solutions to pressing issues
and shared meanings of the common good because these form the basis of a public consensus for
action. When seeking consensus on civic action, the emphasis is not on our distinctiveness but on
the search for shared experiences, reasons, and goals. As Mooney notes: "Remember that we are
talking here about how to achieve consensus on civic action, not consensus on religous belief." Id.
at 31. I think Mooney's model for public discourse is a vital key to our society's survival in the
face of ever-increasing pluralism: we all must become translators and interpreters. And we all must
enter the discourse willing to compromise.
28. One story that gives pause for thought is Kurt Vonnegut's short story, Adam. See Kurt
Vonnegut, Jr., Adam, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 285-92 (1968). It is not about cloning,
per se. But it is about birth, the human impulse to continue family bloodline, and how one couple's
miracle is another couple's non-event. Hans Knechtmarm and his wife Ava had grown up in the
Nazi camps. Heinz "was only twenty-two, but seemed and felt much older. He had died a little
as each member of his family had been led away and killed by the Nazis, until only in him, at the
age of ten, had life and the name of Knechtmann shared a soul." Id. at 285., The story takes place
in the waiting room of a hospital delivery room; Ava is in labor. "This would be his second child.
The last time he had waited, he had waited on a straw-tick in a displaced-persons camp in Germany.
The child, Karl Knechtmann, named after Heinz's father, had died, and with it, once more, had died
the name of one of the finest cellists ever to have lived." Id. at 286. The baby is born, it is
healthy, and Heinz is ecstatic. When he sees the baby, he sees sparks of his family in him, sparks
of the Knechtmann line. Heinz calls the baby a "treasure house. Everything is saved in you." Id.
at 288. Heinz tries to share his wonder and excitement with another new father from the waiting
room, but this man's reaction to the birth of yet another child is ho-hum. When Heinz visits Ava
the next morning, she asks him how the baby is. Their exchange ends the story:
"Perfect. Perfect, Avchen."
"They couldn't kill us, could they, Heinz?"
"No."
"And here we are, alive as we can be."
"Yes."
"The baby, Heinz-" She opened her dark eyes wide. "It's the most wonderful thing
that ever happened, isn't it?"
"Yes," said Heinz.
Id. at 292.
Heinz and Ava had their child. To take great license with the story: what if Heinz and Ava
could not have a child? What if cloning was the only way to carry on their family line, and they
had no ethical objections to using cloning and in vitro fertilization? Is it truly "playing God" to
restore what evil human beings have destroyed? Just as those who support cloning ignore at their
peril the fears of the public and the flaws of their own system of checks and balances, so, too, must
principled opponents of cloning with open heart and mind consider the importance of family line and
family tradition to the human race.
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can be continued under standards and limits established by group consensus. In
sum, I have offered no grand solutions to the cloning debate; indeed, I hope to
have added further complexity to it, a complexity that the casuistical process is
uniquely equipped to handle.
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